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Cooperation, Coordination and the Social Bond: On Integration from a Critical 
Cognitive Social-Theoretical Perspective 
 
Piet Strydom 
School of Sociology and Philosophy 
University College Cork 
Ireland 
           
The concept of integration implies cooperation and coordination but, above all, the social bond – the 
central concern of sociology since its emergence. Peculiarly enough, however, sociologists and more 
generally social scientists have been confounded by this internal differentiation of the problem of 
integration. From Durkheim to Parsons and Habermas, to mention but a few, the distinct dimensions 
of cognitive competences, practices, collectivity, systems and cognitive commonality have been 
misapprehended and short-circuited in ways that still misdirect thinking today.i Although Schiller 
legitimately sounded a serious problem experienced in early modernity, his complaint serving as 
Ananta Kumar Giri’s epigraph is evidently infected by a related ambiguity. Giri himself indeed insists 
on: going beyond identity and difference; differences having a dimension of non-difference; the 
integral dimension of transcendence; communication among differences and its relation to the 
temporal dimension; the on-going process of unsettling and establishing connections; dynamic 
harmonisation and unity, and so forth. Yet there remains a degree of lack of transparency in his 
poser, too, particularly regarding coordination, non-difference and transcendence. Should the 
coordination mechanism of system not be freed from its widespread misunderstanding – going back 
to Schiller, among others – by sociologists and social scientists? What is the locus or ontological 
status of non-difference? And what is transcendence, including the vehicle of such a reaching from 
within the situation with all its differences towards non-difference? 
 
Integration is intimately interwoven with and therefore dependent on different forms of 
communication. It begins with social interaction at the micro-level where cooperation, the initial 
form taken by integration, is generated. Beyond this level, however, more complex forms of society 
require coordination achievements for their integration. For this, social interaction is no longer 
sufficient on its own, since the structures and systems that go beyond and have a formative effect 
on particular situations can only be generated by discourse, in conjunction with more pervasive 
evolutionary shifts. Now, cooperation and coordination are possible, in turn, only on the basis of the 
social bond – i.e., the common assumption or presupposition of a deep-seated set of generative-
regulative meta-structures or meta-rules, what may be called the cognitive order of society (Strydom 
2000, forthcoming) which is constitutive of the social world.ii Even if social interaction and discourse 
are implicated in the emergence and reproduction of the cognitive order, they nevertheless depend 
on the latter not merely for orientation, but above all for their incorporation in an all-encompassing 
world. Where such an order is wanting or where different cognitive orders meet, there indifference, 
lack of understanding, misunderstanding, misattribution of motives and goals, and even irresolvable 
conflict are not uncommon. This, in fact, is a characteristic contemporary experience. 
 
Today, we find ourselves in a transitional phase facing a nascent global social world which is as yet 
ill-defined due to the fact that the concurrent cognitive order is likewise caught in a process of 
construction and emergence. Since the dropping of the atom bomb, the end of World War II, the 
founding of the United Nations, the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
establishment of international organisations, phenomena like decolonisation, ecologism and 
cosmopolitanism, and lately the shift of the centre of gravity from the West to the East – since all 
these, the cognitive order of modernity shaped on the basis of the Enlightenment has been 
undergoing subtle and not so subtle drifts, evolutionary shifts and cultural elaborations (Strydom 
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2000, 2011b, 2011c). It is nevertheless still sufficiently available as the horizon of the present to put 
some incursive pressure on all existing social worlds and the recalcitrant constraining elements of 
their respective cognitive underpinnings.iii Although this is the case, a new rendition of integration in 
the cognitive order, a reconstitution of systemic procedural mechanisms toward its 
operationalization, and new practices aimed at its actualisation – taken together, ‘a new art of 
integration’ as Giri eloquently yet all too briefly calls it – are indeed a desideratum. A new rendition 
of integration could be achieved only by a renewed selection and combination of a number of 
appropriate principles from the cognitive order, particularly new interpretations of such principles 
as: rightness, sovereignty, legality, freedom, equality, solidarity, constitutionalism, authenticity and 
learning. Such a cognitive reconfiguration would for the first time secure the kind of integration at 
the macro or global cosmopolitan level demanded today. Complementarily, operationalizing 
procedural mechanisms for the organisation of society such as the economic, political, techno-
scientific and other systems would require far-reaching transformation. In turn, the practices 
embodying and actualising the potentials of the cognitive order and the procedural mechanisms call 
for an equally drastic transformation of the underlying modern cognitive competences and the 
cultivation of new ones. Crucial to the achievement of a new art of integration at all these levels, 
therefore, is learning – individual, institutional, collective and above all societal learning. 
 
Giri is also correct, therefore, that the pursuit of a new art of integration in this sense is central to 
the contemporary societal as well as the social scientific task. Yet his formulation of this requirement 
begs the question: If it is to be more than merely an appeal to an impotent ought, if it actually forms 
part of a movement of immanent transcendence, what precise basis does the call for a new art of 
integration have in reality? And further: If, as we have learned historically, integration typically 
involves over and above legitimate means also elements of compulsion and even force, then the 
question arises whether more should not be made of individuation, autonomy and both the capacity 
and responsibility to say no. The cultivation of ‘weakness’, ‘servanthood’ and ‘non-sovereignty’, 
surely, cannot mean acquiescence or, even worse, languishing in heteronomy? 
 
On the whole, then, greater precision could be achieved if, instead of reproducing the traditional 
contrast between ‘the cognitive and the emotional’, the cognitive making of the social world – 
particularly in the sociocultural but also the biological sense – were taken into account (Strydom 
2011a, 2011c, 2012).iv How else could weak naturalism and ‘weak ontology’ converge and meet?v 
Attention would here be paid to generative or constructive cognitive competences such as action 
and interaction, to cognitive coordination mechanisms such as discourses, systems and cultural 
models and their structure-forming interrelations, and finally to the cognitive order of society in 
both its constitutive and regulative roles. The possibility of cooperation, coordination and the social 
bond – i.e., of integration – could then be accounted for, together with any interfering forces in the 
process rendering them vulnerable and damaged. More deeply still, light would be shed not only on 
the ontological status of the cognitive order – which enables ‘non-difference’ – and its incursive 
shaping of society, but also on the human capacity for ‘transcendence’ responsible for disclosing 
potentialities, thus constructing and reconstructing the cognitive order (Strydom 2011a). A ‘new art 
of integration’ requires each and every one of these moments. Signs are that the promise of these 
moments are already present in our time, but whether they will be sufficiently actualised, not to 
mention realised, depends entirely on the degree to which we contemporaries engage intellectually, 
practically and emotively. Adopting the principle of charity, I take exactly this to be the thrust of 
Giri’s argument. 
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Notes 
 
i Among other things, Durkheim identified the cognitive – which allows for both commonality and 
difference – with the collective which snuffs out difference and breeds authoritarianism, as in his 
theory of education. Parsons more so than Habermas, but even the latter, tended to reduce the 
cognitive to the normative, with the comparable effect of playing down difference and contestation. 
In addition, Habermas misconstrued system, an essential emergent cognitive mechanism of 
coordination above the action level, as being exhausted by the exploitative and dominational form 
given to it by modern class structures. In a certain sense, he might well be seen as having remained 
ensnared in a line of thinking running from Schiller to Heidegger. 
ii By the cognitive order of society, I understand the complex of idealised yet necessary and universal 
suppositions that constitute a social world by making communication possible, allowing the 
regulation of action, interaction and discourse, and endowing the members with the cognitive ability 
to reflexively assess reasons and justify their speech and actions. Far from necessarily imposing 
homogeneity, however, these suppositions also stimulate differences, being as they are common 
reference points for mutually contested interpretations and attempts at their immanent realisation.  
iii The following gives a by no means exhaustive overview of the cognitive order of modernity 
embracing a complex of reflexive meta-rules qua principles or standards which emerged over time in 
particular domains and articulated by representative figures. Although a number of these 
presuppositions have meanwhile undergone modification and transformation or are still undergoing 
change today, their structuring or incursive force continues to be felt to varying degrees with distinct 
emphases in different civilizational-societal configurations around the globe. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
CENTURY REPRESENTATIVE  DOMAIN  PRINCIPLE/STANDARD 
 
12th  Andreas Capellanus  intimacy  love 
15th  Filippo Brunelleschi  technology  effectiveness 
16th  Nicolo Machiavelli  power   control 
16th  Jean Bodin   state   sovereignty 
16-17th  Galileo Galilei   nature   mathematisation 
17th  Francis Bacon   knowledge  instrumentality 
17th  René Descartes   cogito   self-reflection 
17th  Isaac Newton   science   mastery 
17th  Thomas Hobbes  coercive law  legality 
17th  John Locke   civil society  freedom 
17th  Pierre Bayle   conviction  critique 
18th  Adam Smith   economy  efficiency 
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18th  Montesquieu   civil society  constitutionalism 
18th   Jean Jacques Rousseau  civil society  solidarity 
18th  Joseph Sieyès   civil society  legitimacy 
18th  Thomas Payne   rights   equality 
18th  Immanuel Kant   culture: 
         pure reason  truth 
         practical reason rightness 
         judgement  authenticity/ 
         appropriateness/ 
         sensus communis 
18th  Jean Jacques Rousseau  education  learning, learning to learn, 
reflexive learning 
19th  Søren Kierkegaard  the self   authentic, responsible 
         auto-relationship 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
iv The traditional contrast of the cognitive and the emotional suffers from at least two serious 
limitations. First, the cognitive is understood in a rather narrow intellectualist and purposive-rational 
sense rather than in its full scope of a differentiated set of biologically based cognitive competences 
(making possible cognition, perception, empathy, social interaction, memory, reflexivity, recognition 
of norms, different kinds of knowledge, context-transcendent imagination, etc.) which in their 
developed human form are supported by a vast complex of cognitive cultural structures or the 
cognitive order of society. Second, the reference to the emotional raises the question of which 
theory of the emotions (see e.g. Cornelius 1996) is presupposed by this contrast. It seems to come 
closest to William James’ theory according to which the emotions are bodily responses to bodily 
changes. But then there are a number of other theories, including the Darwinian, the cognitive, the 
constructivist and the contemporary cognitive neurophysiological. A careful, critical, comparative 
consideration of these theories would suggest that the traditional contrast is untenable. The 
emotions have a cognitive neurophysiological base, but should not be confused with sensations as 
James tends to do, since they arise from a cognitive evaluation of both experience and the 
environment, and are therefore of a general nature, structured by cognitive cultural structures, thus 
able also to fulfil a Darwinian adaptive function. An option that is even less plausible than James’ 
would be to treat the emotions nominalistically as purely socially constructed phenomena. 
v ‘Weak naturalism’ is an ontological position which assumes that there is continuity between nature 
and the sociocultural world without, however, reducing the latter to the former, as in strong 
naturalism. Nature is here understood as the natural historical or evolutionary process that, among 
other things, gave rise to human beings characterised by their unique cognitive endowment and 
cognitive competences which took millennia to attain the level of development they exhibit since 
40,000 years ago. ‘Weak ontology’, in my understanding, appertains to the sociocultural world. It is a 
position which indeed assumes the existence of the human cognitive endowment and competences, 
but it pleads for a more balanced and justifiable employment of our intellectual, moral-ethical and 
emotive potentialities for the purposes of constructing a well-ordered interpersonal world than has 
been the case in the wake of such events as: the emergence of the modern state, the capitalist 
economy, science driven by the technological a priori, and the unencumbered self – especially homo 
economicus or the possessive individual but also the self-absorbed aesthetic self – as well as the 
dogmatic and authoritarian moral self. In so far as weak naturalism as an ontological position avoids 
strong reductive naturalism, it converges with weak ontology. From a social scientific point of view, 
both are focally concerned with the sociocultural world. In this they complement each other. Weak 
naturalism (together with its complement, a pragmatic-epistemic realist epistemology) brings the 
necessary cognitive structuration of the sociocultural world through a learning process from the 
Strydom, ‘Cooperation, Coordination and the Social Bond: On Integration from a Critical Cognitive Social-Theoretical 
Perspective’, Sociological Bulletin: Journal of the Indian Sociological Society 62(1) January-April 2013, pp.115-21, 
contribution to a symposium on ‘Rethinking Integration’. 
 
5 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
micro to the macro level to light, while weak ontology specifies a range of conditions as well as a 
meaning reference or orientation complex which is relevant to steering the contemporary phase of 
the formation of society in a constructive direction.  
